[-Waffenampt-]

German Infantry Squad & Platoon Battle Tactics

I thought I would write this up tonight to display some basics of the German Army's most effective unit, The normal Infantry Squad.

The German squad is thought of as the finest and most effective of all the small infantry units in World War II. With radical new concepts and ideas on desperation, tactics, and firepower. This writing is a brief view of real German fighting tactics of the time to get an Idea of how it really was.


Squad Formations, Close Order

Below are 3 Squad formations used by the Germans. Fig three displays the German squad, although in close order, movement in combat formation unless otherwise, as mentioned in the following text.


(Fig. 1 Squad Symbols)

A = Gruppen Fuhrer
B = MG-Schutze 1
C = MG-Schutze 2
D = Schutze
E = Truppefuhrer

(Fig. 2 Squad Line)

E - D - D - D - D - D - C - B - A

(Fig. 3 Squad Column & March Order)

A
B
C
D
D
D
D
D
E

Squad Formations

When the situation, terrain and hostile activity no longer permit close order formation the Gruppe adopts open formation - that is, deployment. The deployment of the gruppe usually follows immediately after the Zug develops. It is executed upon signal, order or command. The principal deployed formations are the squad column and the skirmish line. The gruppe is always deployed as a unit, and the machine gunner as the base man.

Squad column:
The squad column (Schutzenreihe) formation is used for approaching the enemy during the fire fight when only the light machine gun is firing and the schutzen are held back. The Truppefuhrer is at the tail of the column to insure the members of the gurppe keep closed up.

(Fig. 4 Schutzenreihe )

A
B
C
D
D
D
D
D
E


Squad skirmish line - Schutzenkette:
If the immediate, combined fire action of both the Light machine gun and the schutzen is required by the situation, the skirmish line formation should be adopted.

(Fig. 5 Schutzenkette Deployment)

Part One: N
-Enemy-

A
B
C
D
D
D
D
D
E

Part Two: N
-Enemy


E D D A B C D D D

The whole gruppe is to engage simultaneously in a fire fight the schutzen take positions according to the terrain, usually building up a skirmish line on both sides of the Machine gun. The Machine gun remains centrally located in the gruppe skirmish line, except where the terrain or situation suggests the deployment of all of the schutzen to the right or to the left.

If it is desired to change the formation from the Gruppe Column to skirmish like in order to take up the fire fight immediately, the Gruppenfuhrer gives the signal or command to deploy. bunching around the Machine gun must be avoided under all circumstances.

In order to form the skirmish line from the squad column, the forward half of the schutzen deploys to the right of the machine gunner and the rear half to his left. The interval between men is approximently 5 paces, unless a different interval is expressly ordered. If it is desired that the Schutzen deploy all on one side, it must be so ordered. If the deployment is executed from the march order, the schutzen take the same positions as inicated by the skirmish line.

(Fig. 6 Schutzenkette Deployment : Right)

N
-Enemy-

A B C D D D D D E

General:
The use of other formations, or the omission of parts of the Gruppe, is permissible only when the situation makes it necessary. In this case special orders should be given. Cohesion within the gruppe must be maintained at all costs.

The formation of the gruppe may be changed from the column to skirmish line to reduce casualties from hostile fire or to negotiate difficult terrain. Formation changes in rough terrain are often necessary in surmounting or avoided obstacles of all kinds or in closing up on rear Gruppen.

It is less important the the distances and intervals be maintained exactly then it is that the gruppe avoid losses; in other words, that it reaches the enemy position in full strength. The attention of the schutzen should directed more in the direction of the enemy and less on the formation.

The Gurppentfuhrer is not restricted to any given position or place. As a rule, he moves before his gruppe. On occasion it may be necessary for him to leave his gruppe temporarily in order to observe the enemy, reconnoiter the terrain and maintain connection with adjacent units. His place is then taken by the Truppfuhrer.

Fire Discipline:

1.) Targets. The schutze fires apon that portion of the target designated to him. In the case of very broad targets he directs his fire at that position directly opposite him. If the selection is left to the schutze, he himself fires upon the target which interfears most with the accomplishment of the squads mission. All
the schutzen must therefore know the combat mission and must understand the gruppenfuhrers plan for its accomplishment.

The selection of the aiming point is usually left of there schutze. In the case of small targets he should aim at the bottom; in the case of large ones, at the middle. If a traget is moving to one side he should lead it on while aiming. Unless the command “Feuer Frei!” (Fire at will) has been given, the schutze will not fire except at targets that suddenly appear at close range. Even this is not permissible if the Gruppenfuhrer has ordered the withholding of fire.

2.) Ammunition. Ammunition supply plays an important role. Hence, every leader must supervise its expenditure carefully and provide for its replenishment. All leaders must know how much ammuntion they have at their disposal and when and how they can be resupplied with it. Each Machine Gun must hold back, as long as possible 200 to 250 round as a reserve.

3.) Range Estimation. Usually the estimate made by the leader provides the basis for the initial sight-seeing. By the action of the enemy and by the impacts of the bullets, the leader and the men should try to determine whether or not the range has been correctly estimated. Poor observation detracts from correct range estimates.

The Squad in Offensive Combat

General Overview

The offensive implis a feeling of superiority. The Attacker has the initiative; He determinds where and when the battle will be fought. Superiority in numbers is not always a decisive factor. Superiority in leadership, in the capacity of the troop (Better Training), in surprise effect and in quick, active seizure and
exploitation of favorable opportunities may lead to complete success against a numerically superior enemy. The First World War presented many examples of this.

To be continued tomorrow


[This message has been edited by -Waffenampt- (edited July 17, 2001).]